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An examination of the relevant literature indicates 
that few attempts have been made to provide a comprehen-
sive cognitive account of identifying reference. Much 
of the work on the subject has taken a decidedly 
linguistic turn. There have been numerous studies of 
the semantic character of singular terms, i. e., definite 
descriptions, proper names, and indexical indicators. 
But many philosophers who pursue such a linguistic 
approach to the theory of reference have not attempted 
to determine the cognitive content of items of knowledge 
which a particular person can express by making use of 
these kinds of singular terms. In this paper I shall 
attempt to fill this gap by developing a cognitive 
approach to the theory of identifying reference. 
According to a cognitive account, identification is a 
thoroughly conceptual process. Consequently, such an 
account implies that whenever a person individuates or 
recognizes an item, he identifies this item by means of 
subsuming it under some concept or group of concepts. 
I 
In current discussions of identifying reference, 
one finds that the following sorts of terms are frequent-
ly employed: "to individuate x," "to identify x," "to 
pick out x," etc. I shall utilize each of these terms 
to elucidate a specific epistemic concept, i.e., the 
concept of a person's having knowledge about a particular. 
Basically, there seem to be three types of knowledge 
which a person may have about a particular. One may 
identify a particular by means of knowing some descrip-
tive fact which uniquely applies to it. For example, 
if I know that the largest pyramid in Egypt is thousands 
of years old, then I have knowledge about the great 
pyramid Cheops. In cases of this sort, a person has 
what may be called descriptive knowledge about a 
particular. On the other hand, a person may pick out 
an item which is an object or component of one of his 
experiences as this or that. In these circumstances, a 
person may use an indexical term to indicate an item of 
which he has had an experience. This is experiential 
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knowledge about a particular. Lastly, if I know state-
ments such as "Joan of Arc was a saint," "Hieronymus 
Bosch was a painter," etc., then I have knowledge about 
the particulars designated by the proper names "Joan of 
Arc" and"Hieronymus Bosch." In these cases, and similar 
ones, a person has what I shall call nominative knowledge 
about a particular. 
Since we do not name every item which we have 
experienced, and do not experience every item for which 
we have a name, it is clear that some items of nominative 
knowledge are distinct from items of experiential knowl-
edge. The distinction between experiential knowledge 
and descriptive knowledge is reminiscent of the distinc-
tion between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by 
description.! If a person is "acquainted" with certain 
items he experiences, then some pieces of experiential 
knowledge are not identical with pieces of descriptive 
knowledge. On the other hand, epistemologists who 
reject the "myth of the given" may deny that there are 
pieces of experiential knowledge which are irreducibly 
nondescriptive in character. Some philosophers have 
argued that typical proper names are concealed definite 
descriptions (Russell, pp. 50-57). These theorists are 
committed to the thesis that typical items of nominative 
knowledge are identical with items of descriptive 
knowledge. Others have argued that typical proper names 
are not concealed definite descriptions.2 If they are 
right, then the view that typical items of nominative 
knowledge are identical with items of descriptive 
knowledge is problematic. 
A theory of identifying reference should provide a 
vehicle for clarifying the cognitive issues involved in 
the controversies described above. A theory of this 
kind is adequate only if it provides solutions to the 
following puzzles. Suppose Mr. Jones is in the house 
of mirrors at a circus, and he thinks that he sees two 
similar looking bulgy red tomatoes in front of him. 
But suppose that in fact Jones is perceiving a single 
tomato: he is perceiving a tomato which is literally 
in front of his eyes, and he also perceives that very 
same tomato by means of one of its reflections in a 
mirror. However, Jones then realizes that he is in the 
house of mirrors, and that he may be seeing reflections 
of a single tomato. It dawns on Jones that he does not 
know that he is seeing two tomatoes. Thus Jones is 
unable to tell whether he sees two tomatoes or one tomato. 
He can express his bafflement by pointing to each tomato 
and asserting: 
(a) "I am unable to tell whether or not this 
tomato is that tomato." 
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Of course, Jones might express his puzzlement in other 
ways. For example, he may be in a position to assert 
that: 
(b) "I am unable to tell whether or not the 
tomato that looks like it's on my right 
is the same tomato which looks like it's 
on my left." 
Or perhaps Jones decides to name the tomatoes. He calls 
the one which appears to be on his right "Arrenzo," and 
he calls the one which appears to be on his left 
"Allenzo." In these circumstances, Jones may have the 
following thought: 
(c) "I am unable to tell whether or not Arrenzo 
is Allenzo." 
On the assumption that Jones is perceiving one tomato, 
how can we account for the truth of (a), (b), and (c)? 
The second sort of puzzle which an adequate theory 
of identifying reference must handle runs something like 
the following. Jones hears the radio broadcaster say 
that "Lew Alcindor is a basketball player." Jones then 
knows that Lew Alcindor is a basketball player. 
Similarly, suppose that when Jones reads the newspaper 
he finds it stated on the sports page that "Kareem Abdul 
Jabbar is a basketball player." He then knows that 
Kareem Abdual Jabbar is a basketball player. But suppose 
that Jones is unaware of the fact that Alcindor = Jabbar. 
Jones is in a position to correctly assert that: 
(d) "I am unable to tell whether or not Alcindor 
is Jabbar." 
On the assumption that Alcindor = Jabbar, how can we 
explain the truth of (d)? 
I propose the following answers to our questions. 
In each of (a), (b), and (c), Jones uses two individual 
concepts to identify a single tomato, e.g., being the 
tomato which looks like it is on his right, and being 
the tomato which looks like it is on his left, but lacks 
the requisite information for knowing that the two 
individual concepts are instantiated by a single tomato. 
Similarly, in (d), Jones uses two individual concepts to 
identify a single basketball player, e.g., being the 
basketball player he heard about on the radio today, 
and being the basketball player he read about in the 
newspaper today, but does not possess the information 
necessary for knowing that these two individual con-
cepts are instantiated by a single basketball player.3 
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Each of the three types of identifying reference 
are illustrated in cases (a) - (d). Furthermore, the 
character of Jones's knowledge in these cases does not 
differ in any important respect from the character of 
typical items of knowledge which a person has about 
various particular objects in his environment. Thus 
answering our questions in this manner implies that if 
a person has knowledge about an item, x, then he subsumes 
x under some individual concept.1* Chisholm has provided 
the following account of the notion of an individual 
concept (Chisholm, pp. 23-ll6). 
Dl: F is an individual concept = df. F is 
a property such that: (i) it is possible 
that something has F, and (ii) it is not 
possible that more than one thing has F 
at a time. 
For example, the property of being the oldest man is an 
individual concept. Dl implies that an individual con-
cept is an identifying characteristic or individuating 
property. Another view is that an individual concept 
is a mode of presentation which is conceptual or quasi-
linguistic in character. The following modified 
version of Dl elucidates the thesis that individual 
concepts are quasi-linguistic or conceptual entities. 
Dl': F is an individual concept - df. F is 
a concept such that: (i) it is possible 
that something falls within the extension 
of F, and (ii) it is not possible that 
more than one thing fall within the 
extension of F at a time. 
I shall presuppose that an individual concept (I£) either 
satisfies Dl or Dl'. 
Consider the following items of knowledge about 
particulars: I know that the desk three feet in front 
of me is brown; I know that Hieronymus Bosch was a 
painter; I know that this tomato is red; I know that I 
feel pain. In each of these four cases I attribute an 
individual concept to some particular. The individual 
concepts attributed in these cases are, respectively, 
being the desk three feet in front of me, being 
Hieronymus Bosch, being thTs, and beTng meT5 
Suppose that being F, and being 6, are individual 
concepts. If it's possible for a person to consider 
the proposition that (Ex)(x is F), and fail to consider 
the proposition that (Ex)(x is G) , then the cognitive 
content of being F differs from the cognitive content 
of being G (cf. Quine, pp. 139-57, Frege, and Ackerman). 
55 
Here is an example which illustrates this principle. A 
person may have learned enough arithmetic to know that 
2 + 2 = H, but not have acquired the concept of a prime 
number. Hence, a person can consider the proposition 
that (Ex)(x is the number 2), and yet fail to consider 
the proposition that (Ex)(x is the even prime number). 
The cognitive content of the individual concept, being 
the number 2, differs from the cognitive content of the 
individual concept, being the even prime number. 
According to the theory of identifying reference I 
am proposing, an individual concept may be individuated 
according to its cognitive content. In the following 
definition I formulate a criterion which individuates 
IC's in this manner. 
D2: The IC, being F, is identical with the 
IC, being G = df. (i) being F is 
necessarily such that it is instantiated 
if and only if being G is instantiated, 
and (ii) being F is necessarily such that, 
for any person S, S considers the 
proposition that something is F if and 
only if S considers the proposition that 
something is G.6 
In D2, the letters "F" and "G" are schematic and-may be 
replaced by any appropriate linguistic expression. If 
we substitute "the tallest man" for both "F" and "G," 
then D2 is satisfied. Whenever we substitute an 
appropriate term for "F," and substitute the same term 
for "G," D2 is satisfied. Thus D2 has the desirable 
implication that every IC is identical with itself. If 
we substitute "the number 2" for "F" and "the even prime" 
for "G," then clause (i) of D2 is satisfied but clause 
(ii) is not. D2 implies that the IC, being the number 
2, is distinct from the IC, being the even prime. If we 
substitute "the tallest man" for "F" and "the shortest 
woman" for "G," then neither clause (i) nor clause (ii) 
of D2 is satisfied. Hence, D2 implies that the IC, 
being the tallest man, is distinct from the IC, being 
the shortest woman. Finally, suppose we substitute 
"the prettiest vixen" for "F" and "the prettiest female 
fox" for "G." Evidently, clause (i) of D2 is satisfied. 
But there might be disagreement over whether or not 
clause (ii) of D2 is satisfied. Consequently, a con-
troversy could arise over whether or not the IC, being 
the prettiest vixen, is identical with the IC, being the 
prettiest female fox. I will not attempt to settle such 
a possible controversy in the present paper. This 
example, and similar ones, show that an appeal to D2 
may not always suffice to resolve a dispute concerning 
the individuation of IC's. 
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There seem to be three types of IC's. This three-
fold classification of IC's is roughly analogous to the 
traditional distinction of singular terms into definite 
descriptions, indexical indicators, and proper names. 
As we shall see, such a typology of IC's corresponds to 
the three kinds of knowledge about particulars 
distinguished earlier. 
I shall call IC's of the first type descriptive IC's 
(D-IC's). Here are some examples of D-IC's: being the 
tallest woman; being the largest city in China; being the 
tallest man in this room; being the desk three feet in 
front of me; being the even prime number. If definite 
descriptions have connotation, then a D-IC is connoted 
by a term d just in case"d"functions as a definite 
description. 
Thus descriptive knowledge (D-knowledge) can be 
characterized as any item of knowledge about a particular, 
x, in which the IC attributed to x is a D-IC. For 
instance: I know that the largest monument in Egypt is 
ancient, where a = the largest monument in Egypt, •*• I 
have D-knowledge about a; I know that the desk three feet 
in front of me is brown, where b = the desk three feet 
in front of me, I have D-knowledge about b. 
I call IC's of the second type experiential IC's 
(E-IC's). Examples of E-ICs include the following: 
being this; being that; being myself. If indexical 
terms have connotation, then an E-IC is connoted by a 
term d just in case d functions as an indexical term 
which a person uses to indicate a particular which is 
an object or component of one of his experiences. 
Thus experiential knowledge (E-knowledge) can be 
characterized as any item of knowledge about a particu-
lar, x, in which the IC attributed to x is an E-IC 
For instance: I perceive a tomato o, and I know that 
this is red, where £ = this, **• I have E-knowledge about 
o; I introspect, and I know that I'm feeling pain + I 
have E-knowledge about myself. It is customary to 
distinguish thi*ee kinds of E-knowledge: perceptual 
knowledge of physical objects, introspective knowledge 
of oneself or one's own mental processes, and memory 
knowledge of particulars known previously by means of 
perception or introspection. If a person knows a 
singular perceptual observation statement of the form 
"This is F," where the property of being F is a sensible 
characteristic, then he has an item of perceptual E-
knowledge. Similarly, if a person knows a first-person 
statement of the form "I am F," where the property of 
being F is a psychological characteristic, then he has 
an item of introspective E-knowledge. 
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I call IC's of the third type nominative IC's 
(N-IC's). Here are some examples of N-IC s : being 
China; being Hieronymus Bosch; being Joan of Arc. If 
proper names have connotation, then an N-IC is connoted 
by a term "d" just in case "d" functions as a proper 
name. 
Thus nominative knowledge (N-knowledge) can be 
characterized as any item of knowledge about a particu-
lar, x, in which the IC attributed to x is a N-IC. 
For example: I know that Hieronymus Bosch was a painter 
•*• I have N-knowledge about Bosch; I know that China is 
a nation -*• I have N-knowledge about China. 
The general notion of a person's having knowledge 
about an item in virtue of attributing an IC to that 
item can now be defined as follows, 
D3: S has knowledge about x in virtue of S 
attributing the IC of being F to s = df. 
(i) being F is an IC, and (ii) x is F, and 
(iii) S knows that something is F. 7 
II 
I shall now discuss some of the questions which 
can be raised concerning the character of N-IC's and 
E-IC's. The following Fregean argument implies that 
more than one N-IC can be instantiated by a single 
item. Reconsider the case of Mr. Jones and Lew Alcindor 
described earlier. If the cognitive content (c.c.) of 
Jones's knowledge that Alcindor exists, is the same as 
the c.c. of Jones's knowledge that Jabbar exists, then 
if Jones were to assert that Alcindor is Jabbar, then 
his assertion would have the same c.c. as his assertion 
that Jabbar is Jabbar. But while Jones knows the 
trifling proposition that Jabbar is Jabbar, he does 
not know the propostion that Alcindor is Jabbar. Thus 
the c.c. of Jones's assertion that Alcindor is Jabbar, 
differs from the c.c. of Jones's assertion that Jabbar 
is Jabbar. Therefore, the c.c. of Jones's knowledge 
that Alcindor exists, is different from the c.c. of 
Jones's knowledge that Jabbar exists. Consequently, 
the N-IC which Jones attritutes to Jabbar when Jones 
knows that Jabbar exists, differs from the N-IC which 
Jones attributes to Jabbar when Jones knows that 
Alcindor exists. 
In this case, what is the c.c. of each of these 
two coinstantiated N-IC's? We know, first, that Jones 
acquired the knowledge that Jabbar exists, while reading 
a newspaper article about him and, second, that Jones 
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acquired the knowledge that Alcindor exists, while 
listening to a radio report about him. One possibility 
is that the N-IC which Jones attributes to Jabbar when 
Jones knows that Jabbar exists, is identical with a D-IC, 
i.e., being the basketball player he read about in the 
newspaper today; and that the N-IC which Jones attributes 
to Jabbar when Jones knows that Alcindor exists , is 
identical with a D-IC, i.e. being the basketball player 
he heard about on the radio today. Evidently, these two 
D-IC's differ in their cognitive content. Consequently, 
if the N-IC's in question are identical with these D-IC's, 
or similar ones, then the differing c.c. of Jones's 
knowledge that Jabbar exists, and Jones's knowledge that 
Alcindor exists, is due to the differing cognitive con-
tent of these D-IC's. 
On the other hand, it may be argued that Jones can 
know that Jabbar is a basketball player, and yet be 
unable to produce any nontrivial descriptive fact which 
uniquely applies to Jabbar.8 Jones acquired the knowl-
edge that Jabbar is a basketball player by means of 
learning it from a reliable authority or accredited 
source of knowledge, i.e., the newspaper. But suppose 
that Jones has forgotten much of what he knows about 
Jabbar, including how he originally acquired his knowl-
edge about Jabbar. It can be argued that under circum-
stances of this kind, Jones might know that Jabbar is a 
basketball player, and yet be unable to produce any 
nontrivial descriptive fact which uniquely applies to 
Jabbar. If this argument is correct, then the N-IC 
which Jones attributes to Jabbar when Jones knows that 
Jabbar exists, is not identical with a D-IC. 
Thus there are two conflicting views concerning the 
character of a given N-IC, 0, 
(VI) 0 is identical with some D-IC; 
(V2) 0 is not identical with some D-IC, i.e., 
0 is a nondescriptive IC. 
However, (V2) is consistent with the claim that 0 stands 
in a significant logical relationship to some D-IC, e.g., 
0 is necessarily coinstantiated with a D-IC, or the 
analysis of 0 is a D-IC (cf. Ackerman). Thus the claim 
that the D-IC, being the basketball player I heard about 
on the radio yesterday, is the analysis of a N-IC, 0, is 
consistent with the claim that this D-IC is not identical 
with 0. 
The cognitive content of an IC and its analysis may 
differ. The analysis of the IC of being the number 2 
is the IC of being the class of all couples. Jones can 
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know that the number 2 is the number 2, and yet not know 
that the number 2 is the class of all couples. Thus the 
IC of being the number 2 and the IC of being the class 
of all couples differ in their cognitive content. Hence, 
the claim that the analysis of a given IC, 0, is a D-IC 
is consistent with the claim that a person who knows that 
0 is instantiated is unable to produce the analysis of 
0, i.e., does not know that the D-IC in question is 
instantiated. The following two claims are consistent 
with one another: (1) the D-IC of being the basketball 
player I read about in the newspaper yesterday is the 
analysis of an N-IC, 0, and (2) I know that 0 is in-
stantiated, and yet do not know that (Ex)(x is the 
basketball player I read about in the newspaper- yester-
day) . 
It is hard to believe that the N-IC which Jones 
attributes to Jabbar when Jones knows that Jabbar exists, 
does not stand in some significant logical relation to 
an appropriate D-IC, e.g., being the basketball player 
he read about in the newspaper today. But the character 
of Jones's N-knöwledge about Jabbar does not differ in 
any significant respect from the character of other 
typical items of N-knowledge which a person has about 
physical objects or persons other than himself. Conse-
quently, if this N-IC is either identical with, or 
analyzable as, a D-IC, then all of a person's N-knowl-
edge about physical objects or persons other than 
himself is either identical with, or analyzable as, 
D-knowledge. 
It is at least initially plausible to suppose that 
in some cases, if a person has experiential knowledge 
about an item, x, then he need not make use of any 
unique descriptive fact in order to identify x. For 
example, if I have amnesia, or if I am in a state of 
sensory deprovation, then I may identify myself as me 
or I, and yet be unable to produce any nontrivial 
descriptive fact which uniquely applies to me. Similarly, 
perhaps a young child identifies the bulgy red tomato he 
is looking at as this, and yet is unable to produce any 
nontrivial descriptive fact which uniquely applies to 
the tomato. Thus if I have a perceptual experience, 
and I identify some item which is an object or component 
of that experience as this, then we may assume prima 
facie that the E-IC I am attributing to the item in 
question is nondescriptive. Similarly, if I have an 
inner experience, e.g., the experience of being conscious, 
and I identify the subject of that experience as me, 
then we are prima facie justified in supposing that the 
E-IC I am attributing to myself is not identical with a 
descriptive IC. 
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When Jones was in the house of mirrors he was un-
able to tell whether or not this red bulgy tomato is 
that red bulgy tomato (although this tomato = that 
tomato). Similar cases can be constructed which do not 
involve the use of mirrors or similar devices. Case 1: 
On Monday Jones perceptually identifies a tomato as 
this. On Tuesday he perceptually identifies the very 
same tomato as this• On Tuesday he remembers completely 
all the experiential knowledge he had about tomatoes on 
Monday. In these circumstances, on Tuesday Jones may 
be unable to tell whether or not this tomato (the tomato 
he sees on Tuesday) is that tomato (the tomato he saw 
on Monday). Perhaps the tomato in question has altered 
its appearance beyond all recognition in the time that 
has elapsed since Monday. Or perhaps on Tuesday Jones 
perceives a number of tomatoes which exactly resemble 
one another in appearance, and Jones cannot tell which 
of them is the tomato he perceived on Monday. 
In case 1 a person perceives a given physical 
object at different times. A person can also (i) per-
ceive a given physical object by means of more than one 
sense at a time (e.g., he can simultaneously see and 
touch an object), and (ii) perceive an object more than 
once by means of a single sense at a time (e.g., he can 
simultaneously touch an object with his right and left 
hand), and (iii) perceive an object more than once by 
means of a single sense-organ at a time (e.g., he can 
simultaneously see an object a number of times by means 
of several reflections of that object in mirrors). I 
shall refer to situations of the kinds described in (i), 
(ii), and (iii) as instances of a person's perceiving 
an object by means of more than one mode of representa-
tion at a time. If a person perceives an object o at 
time t by means of more than one mode of representation 
m^, m 2 , . • • m n, then at t he may be unable to tell 
that the thing he experiences by means of m^ at t is 
identical with the thing he experiences by means of m 2 
at t, . . . is identical with the thing he experiences 
by means of m n at t. Jones was in such a situation when 
he visited the house of mirrors. An even more striking 
example of this sort is found in case 2: Suppose that 
each of my eyes is attached to a long hollow cylindrical 
tube in such a way that each eye sees only through its 
respective tube. Imagine that I am staring at a tomato 
x at time t with my right eye focused on x» through its 
cylinder, and my left eye focused on x, through its 
cylinder. If things are set up properly, I will be 
seeing x twice at t, i.e., I will have two distinct 
visual experiences of x at t. In these circumstances, 
I may find myself in a position where I do not know that 
I am not seeing two tomatoes which exactly resemble one 
another in appearance. If I am in this sort of position, 
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then I cannot tell that the tomato I identify as this 
(by means of seeing it with my left eye) is the tomato 
I identify as that (by means of seeing it with my right 
eye), although in fact I am perceiving a single tomato. 
Similar cases can be constructed for all of our senses. 
If at time t one's eyes are closed, then at t one may 
be touching a physical object with both one's right and 
left hand, and yet at t be unable to tell that this 
(the thing one is touching with one's right hand at t) 
is that (the thing one is touching with one's left hand 
at t). If at time t one's hands or arms are hidden from 
one's sight, then at t one may be both seeing and touch-
ing a physical object and yet at t be unable to tell 
that this (the thing one is seeing at t) is that (the 
thing one is touching at t). Such cases are construct-
able for any combinations of the senses of sight, touch, 
hearing, taste, and smell. 
If we apply the Fregean argument presented earlier 
to these cases, then it can be proven that more than one 
E-IC can be instantiated by a single item. If the c.c. 
of Jones' knowledge that this tomato exists, is the same 
as the c.c. of his knowledge that that tomato exists, 
then if Jones were to assert that this tomato is that 
tomato, then his assertion would have the same cognitive 
content as his assertion that this tomato is this 
tomato. But while: Jones knows the trifling proposition 
that this tomato is this tomato, he does not know that 
this tomato is that tomato. Thus the c.c. of Jones' 
assertion that this tomato is that tomato, differs from 
the c.c. of Jones1 assertion that this tomato is this 
tomato. Therefore, the c.c. of Jones' knowledge that 
this tomato exists, is different from the c.c. of his 
knowledge that that tomato exists. Consequently, the 
E-IC which Jones attributes to the tomato when he knows 
that this tomato exists, is differenct from the E-IC 
which Jones attributes to the tomato when he knows 
that that tomato exists. A distinct E-IC corresponds 
to each of the various modes of representation by means 
of which an object can be perceived. 
Despite the presumption in favor of the nondescrip-
tive character of E-IC's, it is tempting to suppose that 
each of the E-IC's which Jones attributes to the tomato 
is identical with a different D-IC, e.g., being the 
tomato that looks like it is on his left, and being the 
tomato that looks like it is on his right. These two 
D-IC's differ in their cognitive content. Thus if the 
E-IC's in question are identical with these D-IC's, or 
similar ones, then the differing c.c.-of Jones's knowl-
edge that this tomato exists, and Jones' knowledge that 
that tomato exists, is due to the differing cognitive 
content of these D-IC's. 
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Thus there are two conflicting views concerning the 
character of a given E-IC, 0, 
(V3) 0 is identical with a D-IC; 
(V4) 0 is not identical with a D-IC, i.e., 0 
is a nondescriptive IC. 
However, (VH) is consistent with the claim that 0 stands 
in a significant logical relationship to some D-IC, e.g., 
0 is necessarily coinstantiated with a D-IC, or the 
analysis of 0 is a D-IC. 
Thus the claim that the D-IC of being the tomato 
that looks like it is on my right is the analysis of an 
E-IC, 0, is consistent with the claim that 0 is non-
descriptive. Furthermore, the thesis that the analysis 
of 0 is a D-IC is consistent with the thesis that a 
person who knows that 0 is instantiated is unable to 
produce the D-IC which is the analysis of 0. The 
following two claims are consistent with one another: 
(1) the D-IC of being the tomato which looks like it is 
on my right is the analysis of an E-IC, 0, and (2) I 
know that 0 is instantiated, and yet do not know that 
(Ex)(x is the tomato which looks like it is on my right). 
It is hard to believe that the E-IC which Jones 
attributes to the tomato when he knows that this tomato 
exists, does not stand in some significant logical 
relation to an appropriate D-IC, e.g., being the tomato 
that looks like it's on his right. But the character 
of Jones' perceptual E-knowledge about the tomato in 
these cases does not differ in any important respect 
from the character of other typical items of perceptual 
E-knowledge which a person has about objects in his 
environment. Therefore, if the E-IC which Jones 
attributes to the tomato when he knows that this tomato 
exists, is either identical with, or analyzable as, a 
D-IC, then all of a person's perceptual knowledge about 
objects in his environment is either identical with, or 
analyzable as, D-knowledge.^ 
University of North Carolina, Greensboro 
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Aristotle, Posterior Analytics in The Basic Works of 
Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 
1941), Bk. I: Ch. 19-23. Aristotle would have said that 
in cases (a) - (d) Jones does not know the middle term. 
4 
Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object: A Meta-
physical Study (La Salle: Open Court, 1976), pp. 23-46. 
Compare Rudolph Carnap, Meaning and Necessity (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1947), pp. 40-41. 
c 
IC's might also be interpreted in terms of the 
identity relation, e.g., being identical with Mozart, 
and being identical with me. 
c 
In D2, "being F is necessarily such that . . . " 
expresses a logical necesiity which is de re with 
respect to the IC of being F. By instantiation I mean 
either an item's exemplifying a property or an item's 
being an instance of a concept. Being coinstantiated 
is being either coexemplified or coextensive. 
7 
The letter "F" is schematic and may be replaced 
by any appropriate linguistic expression. 
8 
See Kripke, and Ackerman, IC's such as being the 
thing identical with Jabbar, and being the thing 
identical with me, are at best trivial or degenerate 
cases of D-IC's. We may prefer to classify IC's of 
these sorts as N-IC's and E-IC's, respectively. 
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Cf. , Russell, pp. '»6-59. Russell argues that all 
of a person's knowledge about particular physical objects 
or persons other than himself is descriptive knowledge. 
But there are three conflicting views concerning the 
character of a given E-IC or N-IC, 0, either (i) is 
identical with a D-IC; or (ii) 0 is a nondescriptive IC 
and the analysis of 0 is a D-IC; or (iii) is a non-
descriptive IC and 0 is not analyzable as D-IC. However, 
Russell's views imply that a person may have non-
descriptive knowledge with respect to items with which » 
he is "acquainted," i.e., his own mental states, abstract 
entities, and himself. For an application of the notion 
of an IC to the theory of acquaintance see Gary 
Rosenkrantz, "Haecceities and Perceptual Identification," 
Grazen Philosophische Studien, forthcoming; and Gary 
Rosenkrantz, ''Acquaintance ," unpublished manuscript. 
